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“Give me some Sugar!”: Rhythm and Structure of Sharing in a
Namibian Community
Michael Schnegg
Abstract
Cooperation and the emergence of social order are two key problems in the social sciences. This pa-
per tests two models (kinship and reciprocity) to explain the selection of sharing partners among the
Damara and Nama in Namibia. The second part of the paper deals with the social order that emerges
from local exchange rules. Recently network science has demonstrated that many networks share one
fundamental property: they are scale free. Exchange networks among the Damara and Nama differ in
many ways from this commonly observed typology. The overall network is better connected, less
centralized and less vulnerable than most scale free networks. Simulations show that these properties
emerge from the most salient cultural sharing norm: reciprocity.
Keywords: Social Network Analysis, Ethnography, Namibia, Simulation
Introduction
The emergence of social order from exchange is a classical theoretical problem in social anthropol-
ogy. Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, and Sahlins labeled these transfers “gift”, “exchange”, and “reciprocity”
and made them the foundation of their respective social theories (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949]; Mauss
1925; Sahlins 1965). In more recent discourses the term “sharing” has won recognition over these
forerunners as a more general concept to describe transactions between two or more actors
(Kishigami 2004). Recent literature in anthropology and demography has very convincingly shown
how actors create kinship and kinship-like relationships through sharing of food, substances and chil-
dren. The intention, to create linkages and to position oneself in the wider kinship network, is often a
major motivation for the transaction (Carsten 2004; Dyson and Moore 1983; Weismantel 1995).
Local rules constitute one end of social organization, global structures the other. Starting in the 1940s
and 1950s Anthropologists employed and developed network analysis as an important conceptual,
methodological, and theoretical tool to study social organization beyond the domain of kinship. For
Anthropologists this interdisciplinary venture became a new impetus from the 80s onward, when
new computational and analytical tools became available (Johnson 1994). It continues to prove a
very powerful means to describe social organization and to test hypotheses about the factors that con-
stitute it (Schnegg 2005; Schnegg 2006a; Schweizer 1996; Schweizer 1997; Ziker and Schnegg
2005).
Even though local exchanges and global structures have been in the focus of anthropology for quite
some time, little is known empirically about the relationship. White and Johansen were the first to
demonstrate some of these micro-macro linkages in a Lévi-Straussian approach to kinship studies
(White and Johansen 2004). Landa, an economist, reinterpreted the classical Kula Ring and hints at
the power of explanations that link exchange norms on the micro level with macro structures. Her ex-
planation builds on two fundamental axioms: the spatial location of the islands and positive transac-
tion costs. Transaction costs include the costs of traveling and building alliances. Landa shows that if
traders want to minimize the costs and maximize the number of islands directly and indirectly linked
to, they have to trade with two adjacent islands. If all actors apply this strategy then the ring structure
that Malinowski observed emerges (Landa 1994: 141pp).
The question of how complex patterns emerge from local exchange recently gained a major boost
from work done outside of the social sciences: in physics (Barabasi and Albert 1999; Pujol et al.
2005). Since the pioneering publication on the emergence of scaling in networks by Barabasis and
Albert in 1999 an astonishing scientific effort has been made to show that complex systems (net-
works) have an underlying architecture that is governed by similar principles. The new and fast
growing discipline of network science has proved that large networks as diverse as connections be-
tween neurons in a nematode worm, the predator-prey relations between species in food webs and the
linkages between web sites show one fundamental property: they are scale free (Albert 2001;
Barabasi and Albert 1999; Barabasi 2002; Montoya and Solé 2002; Newman 2003).
Scale free characterizes the distribution of linkages in a network. Scale free networks are dominated
by a few hubs; nodes with a very high degree. In contrast the vast majority of nodes have very few
links. These structures prove to be very efficient in connecting a random pair of nodes with few links.
Barabasi and Albert identified the exchange rule that leads to a scale free typology as “preferential at-
tachment”. In a growing network nodes that are already well connected are more likely to attract new
linkages: the well connected become better connected; the rich get richer (Barabasi 2002).
Demand Sharing in a Namibian Community
This article analyzes sharing among the Damara and Nama people in north-western Namibia in the
light of these new insights about the emergence of order. The data presented here were collected dur-
ing 18 months of field work among the Damara and Nama people in Fransfontein, a rural community
in north-west Namibia. The fieldwork was carried out by my wife, Julia Pauli (University of Co-
logne), and I on equal terms as part of the collaborative research project “Kultur- und Landschafts-
wandel im ariden Afrika (SFB 389)” funded by the German National Science Foundation (DFG).
Fransfontein is a settlement area and consists of 137 households. The surrounding landscape is dotted
with small settlements of 3 to 15 houses. They group around permanent water holes. In the semi- arid
environment with annual rainfalls below 250 mm natural resources are scarce, scattered and unpre-
dictable. The Damara and Nama people are Khoekhoegowab speakers. Khoekhoegowab is a
Khoisan language that is primarily spoken in Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. Both ethnic
groups make a very similar living today. Small stock farming, wage labor on commercial farms, state
welfare (pension payments), employment in the public sector and remittances from relatives in the
urban centers make up the largest proportion of the household income. Households often mix differ-
ent livelihood strategies to buffer risk and to reduce their social vulnerability. The majority of house-
holds live with a daily income below one Euro.
Demand sharing (augu) is a vital part of everyday life in Fransfontein. It provides the most flexible
share of goods consumed by a household. People in Fransfontein use a wide range of different words
to refer to different transactions. The Khoekhoegowab word au means to give. augu literarily de-
scribes the relationship between two people established through au. With au the giver does not ex-
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pect the item to be returned. This is different with two other types of sharing, ma or /khuwi, where the
good is expected to be returned. At mealtimes households can expect a neighbor’s child to pass by
and to confront the household with the demand: “Au te re sugari!” (Give me some sugar!). The
household who sent the child then neither has sugar nor cash to buy it in the local stores. Sugar is one
of the most important energy components of the diet. If the household who is asked to share currently
possesses sugar there exists a strong normative expectation to share some of it. The quantity given is
usually a cup, about 150g (600 kcal). Besides food (maize meal, sugar and milk) augu exchanges in-
clude to a much lesser extent non-food items such as firewood, washing powder, tobacco and snuff.
Data
During 10 days of our fieldwork we collected information on all the augu transactions of 62 house-
holds. Households were not selected randomly. Rather, we tried to maximize the variation within the
sample and selected households from different types of living conditions (settlement area/ farm) and
different economic backgrounds (with and without regular wage income). We interviewed each
household on a daily basis and recorded the augu transactions over the previous 24 hours. Some of
the interviews where done by local assistants and some by the lead researchers. The interviews took
on average 10 to 15 minutes a day. The 62 households reported a total of 1740 augu transactions over
the complete period of 10 days. These individual transactions were aggregated over the complete
time period to compile the social network data analyzed below.
After this initial round of interviews we entered the data into the computer and generated a second
questionnaire for each household, to collect socio-demographic information about ego and its alters.
In addition to this quantitative data almost by necessity as part and parcel of participant observation
we participated during the 18 months of our stay in Fransfontein in augu. Linguistic and cognitive
data on the significance of different types of exchange relationships complement the behavioral in-
formation.
Exchange rules
A range of different hypotheses have been proposed to explain why people share food and other
goods in small scale societies. Here we focus on the two most prominent ones: kinship and reciproc-
ity. In the evolutionary debate the kinship hypothesis is a part of the fitness theory that formulates that
an actor is willing to share with a relative because s/he would eventually profit from the greater repro-
ductive success of relatives. Hamilton proposes that actors should be willing to share with kin, when
the cost (C) to the giver is smaller than the benefit (B) to the recipient times the coefficient of related-
ness (r) that describes the genetic relationship between both actors (C < B × r) (Hamilton 1964). A
number of empirical studies have provided empirical evidence for the kinship hypothesis (Betzig and
Turke 1986; Schweizer 1997; Ziker and Schnegg 2005).
The kinship hypothesis is relatively unproblematic to test empirically. I restricted myself for compar-
ative purposes to consanguineal kinship.1 To reconstruct the kinship coefficient we recorded for all
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1 This does not mean that affine links are less important in Fransfontein but the evolutionary models discus-
sed above are usually restricted to consanguineal kinship.
62 informants and their household members their ancestors as far back as the informants remem-
bered. These data were submitted into the software Descent to compute Wright’s coefficient of relat-
edness (Hagen 2004). The output is analogous to the sharing matrix. Cells of the matrix show the re-
lationships between all the people in the 62 households. This matrix was aggregated on the household
level to contain information about the average kinship coefficient between any two households in the
sample. To test whether the two matrices are correlated a matrix permutation test (QAP, Quadratic
Assignment Procedure) is used (Hubert and Schulz 1976). QAP provides two statistics: the Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient between the two variables and an estimated level of signifi-
cance. Since the entries in a matrix are not independent common tests of significance are not applica-
ble. The procedure therefore reshapes the matrix row and columnwise and correlates it with the de-
pendent variable. It does this many thousands of times and reports the proportion in which the ob-
served correlation was as high as the correlation between the simulated matrixes. Demand sharing
and the kinship network are significantly correlated: r=0.139, p=0.000.
Unlike the kinship model, reciprocity does not require assumptions about the genealogical relation-
ship between the sharing partners. Direct reciprocity involves some level of trust and creates the
problem of free riding (Ostrom 2003). It is most likely to work in small groups where repeated inter-
actions are highly likely (Axelrod 1984).2 Each of the 62*61/2 (=1891) dyads between the 62 house-
holds can have either of the four states: the null state (a <-!-> b), the reciprocal state (a <–> b), and
either of two asymmetric states (a –> b or a <– b) (Holland and Leinhardt 1970)3. The augu network
has 58 reciprocal, 80 asymmetrical and 1753 null dyads. The proportion of reciprocal ties is higher
than Ziker and Schnegg reported for Dolgan and Nganasan i.e. 26 ties were reciprocal and 58 asym-
metrical. One strategy to examine the significance of the observed distribution is the use of simula-
tions. Snijder has developed a simulation model to test the significance of the dyadic census. The
model conditions density and degree distribution. We ran 10,000 simulations to estimate a random
level of reciprocity for comparable data sets. The models estimate 7.5 (s.d. 2.5) as the number of re-
ciprocal ties that would be expected by chance. The observed value is almost eight times higher!
These results clearly indicate that augu is reciprocal.
Network Structures
Networks emerge if many dyadic relationships are viewed as a whole. The network of exchanges
among the 62 households is shown in Figure 1. The position of the nodes does not reflect their geo-
graphic location. Rather, they are aligned so that nodes which exchange regularly are drawn closer
together and nodes that have little or no direct and indirect contact are pushed further apart.4 The
graph in Figure 1 contains no isolates. All but two households interviewed are connected through
augu relationships. If we restrict the measure for connectivity further to k=2 we find that 87.1 % of
the households (N=54) still belong to the redundant and cohesively connected “backbone” of the ex-
change system.
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2 Recently research has extended the notion of reciprocity to indirect reciprocity in which giver and receiver
are not the same person anymore (Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). I excluded
this type of reciprocity from the current analysis.
3 What we refer to as the reciprocal state is also referred to in the literature as the mutual or complete state
(Holland and Leinhardt 1970; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
4 The graph was produced with Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 2003).
Recent research on the evolution of complex systems has demonstrated that a wide range of networks
share one fundamental property: they are scale free. Each node in a network has k links. K is also
called the degree of a node. Networks are scale free if the degree distribution P(k) follows a power
law (P(k) ~ ky). Scale free networks are dominated by a few hubs, nodes with a very high degree
(Barabasi and Albert 1999; Barabasi 2002; White and Johansen 2004).
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Figure 1: Augu Exchange Network
Figure 2 shows three different networks with 62 nodes and a mean degree of 4.5. The first network
(A) is a random network (also called Erdos-Renyi graph). The distribution of links in the network is
shown in the graph (a) below the figure. The x-axis of the graph gives the number of links (k) and the
y-axis the number of nodes (actors) with k links. The distribution shown in (a) has a bell shape. Given
the small number of nodes the fit is imperfect but it is clearly visible that some nodes have few ties,
many have an average number of connections and again a few have many ties. The second network
(B) in figure 2 contrasts with this pattern. This network is scale free in a qualitative sense. It is clearly
dominated by a centre and some central hubs, even though the number of nodes are much too small to
produce a real scale free typology. The graph (b) below shows the corresponding distribution of
links. Typically for a scale free network a few nodes have many links and most have very few. There
is no middle group. This distribution is also called a power law distribution. The last graph (C) shown
in figure 3 is the augu network. Its structure is quite different from the scale free network. It is much
more decentralized and egalitarian. The graph (c) below supports this impression. The distribution of
nodes does not follow a clear power law but rather a mixture of both patterns. As with power law dis-
tributions we find some nodes have a lot of links on the left hand side of the graph. However the mode
(maximum) of the distribution is not the smallest value, as in a scale free network. The left hand side
of the distribution is formed like a normal distribution. Later we will use simulations to test how these
distributions emerge.
Reciprocity in growing networks
The network structure that emerges from augu transactions is not scale free but less hierarchical and
more robust than a scale free graph. Physicists have proposed “preferential attachment” as the under-
lying principle that produces scale free network structures. Social scientists had formulated similar
ideas before (Merton 1968; Moreno 1936; Price 1976). The social relationships analyzed in much de-
tail over the last years include co-acting in movies, scientific co-authorships, scientific citations, and
sexual relationships (Newman 2001; Newman 2003). I have recently shown that many ethnographic
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Figure 2: Comparison between different Network Typologies
cases typically show a different pattern. They are much less scale free or not scale free at all (Schnegg
2006b).
The question becomes why augu is not scale free and what rules can account for the typology we ob-
serve? If we translate the rule of “preferential attachment” to the local circumstances it would mean
asking those who have already been asked a lot in the past. Given the high degree of economic in-
equality in a society, that would mean asking those who are better off. While this may be true for
some transactions it is not the norm. The norm is to ask those whom you have assisted in the past. The
norm is direct reciprocity. We call this model “reciprocal attachment” or reciprocity. In his seminal
work almost 50 years ago, Rapoport introduced the idea of studying the effects of reciprocity on net-
work structures. Unfortunately during this time computational opportunities where too limited to put
his ideas to test (Rapoport 1957; Rapoport 1958).
The aim of our simulation model is to test what happens when people in a network start playing with a
history of previous exchanges in mind instead of only looking after important hubs when choosing
new exchange partners. The simulation starts with a loosely connected Erdös-Rényi-type network in
which each node picks two partners at random and gives them something (degree=2). In the second
step it iterates through 10 rounds of exchanges for each player. The starting condition is different
from the seed usually defined in the BA model. In the BA model the starting configuration is a small,
fully connected graph. Since we want to allow all nodes to choose partners according to previous ex-
changes as well, we must define a status quo before running the actual simulation. The easiest status
quo is a random graph. Throughout all 10 rounds of the simulation we allow all 10,000 vertices to se-
lect partners to give something to according to one of the following two rules: (1) pick your partner
with a probability proportional to its number of incoming links (preferential attachment) or (2) ran-
domly pick one of the players who gave you something in the past (reciprocal attachment). The first
choice is made with probability P; otherwise we take the second choice, randomly at each iteration.
The resulting degree distributions are stored and averaged over 10 simulation runs.
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Figure 3: Degree distributions for different models. Results are averages over 10 simulations
Figure 3 shows the degree distributions with varying probabilities P, that actors play reciprocally.
The two extremes, P=0 (full BA) and P=1 (full reciprocity), are well known: A power law distribu-
tion on the one hand and a Poisson distribution on the other. Effective values of gamma between
those two extremes are combinations of the two rules. Adding only small percentages of the reciproc-
ity rule to the exchange system alters its structure. The distribution of ties in the augu network has a
long tail, indicating some hubs. At the same time the mode (maximum) is not the smallest number of
links. It combines properties from a Gaussian and a power law distribution. The simulations show
precisely how this can emerge: If reciprocity and memory are added as a supplementary rule in the
exchange system.
Conclusion
This article focused on principles that govern exchange and the networks that emerge from those
transactions. We did this both empirically and through simulations. In Fransfontein these network re-
lations are built and enforced through the relatively strict norm to reciprocate directly. New kinship
studies view sharing as a fundamental means to create relatedness. Peterson noted that universal sys-
tems of kin classification are a well known characteristic of hunting gathering societies. Although the
Damara and Nama do not live from hunting and gathering anymore their kinship terminology is
classificatory. Peterson stresses that in a kinship system where ego is formally linked with almost ev-
erybody else social practice enforces and reinforces kinship ties. Sharing creates relationships and
social order and is much more strategic as a spontaneous demand. It not only minimizes risk but also
helps to manage uncertainty. Sharing is also a key element for the production and reproduction of so-
cial relations, egalitarianism and the self (Peterson 2002).
The norm of “reciprocal attachment” which we proposed for Fransfontein as a major addition to the
“preferential attachment” does not govern all decisions to share. Stratification is pronounced and dif-
ferent households have different needs and different abilities to give. “Preferential attachment” re-
flects the logic to go and ask where there are more resources to share. If all exchanges were like this
they would be one of the hubs in the scale free network. However, the more the exchanges are gov-
erned by the norm of reciprocity the more likely a network will emerge that matches the institution
described here: A network that is largely egalitarian, robust and well connected. A third strong pre-
dictor of exchange that we did not look into is geographical proximity. We have seen that if reciproc-
ity is included decentralized networks emerge. The tendency to ask those that are nearby roots these
networks in space. The result from these two local exchange rules is the decentralized and localized
network that we find augu to be. The network structure we observe emerges from these local rules.
Figures
Figure 1: Augu Exchange Network
Figure 2: Comparison between different Network Typologies
Figure 3: Degree distributions for different models. Results are averages over 10 simulations
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